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This article addresses the development of a framework for the 
formation of an adequate approach to moral theorising in bioethics. 
Bioethics has largely been dominated by the influence of two 
approaches to moral reasoning, viz. utilitarianism and Kantian 
deontology. In terms of utilitarianism, actions are to be judged right or 
wrong, not based on their inherent characteristics, but purely on the 
desirability of their consequences.[1] In contrast, deontology asserts 
that deeds have inherent moral worth. There is, in itself, something 
wrong with acts such as stealing, lying and cheating, irrespective of 
their consequences. For someone like Immanuel Kant, moral acts are 
right, not because of their consequences, but because they adhere to 
our inalienable and universal sense of duty.[2]
Both of these approaches have been extensively criticised for a 
range of problems and shortcomings. We aim to develop an approach 
to moral reasoning that we find more suitable, and which enables one 
to incorporate some valuable aspects of these frameworks without 
succumbing to their deficiencies.
An ethics of responsibility (ER)
We prefer to promote an approach that was originally introduced 
by Max Weber,[3] and further developed in the work of the German 
philosopher Hans Jonas.[4] It has become known as the ethics of 
responsibility (ER). This theory has also been developed in the work 
of Zygmunt Bauman,[5] drawing on the French phenomenologist 
Emmanuel Levinas,[6] and in the work of the first[7-10] and second[11] 
authors. To take or accept responsibility means to be able to be 
held accountable for whatever decisions are taken, on the basis of the 
assumption that reasons can be provided, that they have been thought 
through, and even though they might be fallible. 
The first author has elsewhere defined an ethics of responsibility 
as ‘An approach where, on the basis of recognition of the moral 
ambivalence associated with most of the phenomena in the social 
world, the main task of moral judgment is not deemed consistency 
within a single paradigm, but the acceptance of responsibility for 
whatever line of action is recommended. This ethics acknowledges 
the benefits of a variety of approaches, but also admits the failures 
that can be identified in most of these approaches. An ethics of 
responsibility is a form of ethics that makes people – all people, 
not only healthcare workers and moral philosophers – accept 
responsibility for the world in which we live and which we create by 
means of science and technology. It is an ethics that no longer allows 
us to accept the idea that morality is exclusively determined by rules, 
codes and laws behind which people can comfortably hide when 
justifying the morality of actions in morally complex situations. It is an 
ethics of responsibility because it demands that we be accountable 
for everything that we invent and design in our attempts to construct, 
apply and evaluate our life ethos – i.e. the value system according to 
which we live.’[7]
This approach, however, raises an important issue concerning 
the basis of morality: to whom are we accountable for our actions? 
Following Bauman[5] and thus drawing on the work of Levinas,[6] we 
argue that individuals are accountable to the unconditional claim 
that others make on them, to (i) be available to others and (ii) to have 
their interests at heart, irrespective of whether others act reciprocally, 
i.e. whether they always act morally and take care of the individual’s 
interests. Accountability towards the other, which also implicates 
accountability towards the environment within which others must 
survive, is the only sustainably defensible basis for morality.
This idea is inspired by Levinas’ insistence on the non-reducibility 
and ungroundability of morality. According to Levinas, moral 
responsibility – to be ‘for’ the other before you can be ‘with’ the 
other – is the first and primary reality of the self. That is, we are what 
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we are only on the basis of being there for the other. Being for-the-
other is the starting point, rather than the product, of all sociality. 
It precedes all other forms of relatedness to the other, including 
those based on knowledge, evaluation, suffering or action. Moral 
responsibility therefore has no ‘foundation’, cause or determining 
factor. The question ‘how is morality possible?’ cannot be answered 
if no foundation or grounds can be identified for it. There is no self 
that precedes the moral self. Simply by being there, we are, essentially, 
there for the other; by being there, we are responsible for the other.[6]
Two central ideas 
An ER is premised on two ideas: first, that an appropriate framework 
for moral decision-making requires us to make room for the 
possibility of failure; second, the idea that, howsoever important the 
consequences may be, we must be able to bear in mind important 
action guides such as rules and principles when making responsible 
moral decisions. We develop this last idea by drawing (unlike Jonas, 
Bauman or Levinas) on Aristotle’s idea of phronesis.
The possibility of failure
An ER requires us to always be ready to bear responsibility for our 
actions. This means that we should carefully reflect on our reasons 
for decisions and actions, and always be willing and ready to provide 
the reasons that we have formulated for any moral decisions. At 
the same time, it implies openness for rebuttal, in case our reasons 
are inadequate or we are faced with more complete information 
or superior reasoning. In that case, an ER admits the possibility of 
failure. In such a situation, the framework requires that a moral agent 
nevertheless be willing to accept responsibility for what has been 
decided, even if it implies the acceptance of blame or even penalties. 
ER is a framework that accepts, within the context of applied 
ethics, that moral decisions need to be taken, at some point, sooner 
rather than later, and that those decisions always carry the risk of 
incompleteness or failure. The moral sphere does not pose questions 
which can be answered with the degree of certainty that is often 
found in the factual sciences. To apply an insight of Paul Ricoeur:[12] 
in ethics one works, not with a ‘logic of verification’, but with a ‘logic 
of validation’. The conclusions reached are based more on probability 
than on certainty.[12] The appropriate analogy is reasoning before 
a court, rather than verifying theoretical propositions with sense 
observations. Judicial reasoning has an intermediary function which 
shows that procedures of validation have a polemical nature. This is 
also typical of reasoning in bioethics. There is, therefore, seldom a 
‘last word’ in the decisions about the moral status of possible actions 
in bioethics.
Gibson[13] takes a different, but analogous, approach to fallibility in 
an ER, concerning the question of respect for the embryo. She points 
out that when we differ about the measure of respect that an embryo 
deserves, it is not similar to the question of whether a racist deserves 
respect. There is sufficient consensus in society that racism is abhorrent 
and should not be tolerated, but when we differ about respect for the 
embryo we ought to acknowledge the limitations of our insights. 
Gibson writes: ‘Respect between moral agents must be understood 
as respect between finite moral agents. As moral agents we are able 
to formulate and act upon moral judgments. As finite moral agents, 
however, there are limits to our knowledge and understanding such 
that even ordinarily decent people sometimes do not know what the 
right thing is, and sometimes make mistakes.’[13] According to Gibson, 
when arguing about issues such as the moral status of the embryo, 
the extent of the uncertainty that we are working within also compels 
us to respect opponents of our views. We may both be mistaken in 
our moral judgment. Our finitude typically becomes apparent when 
we deal with an issue such as the moral status of the embryo.
Her position, which we strongly support, becomes even clearer 
in the following passage: ‘Ethically acceptable uses of the embryo 
have to be worked out in a way that acknowledges that the human 
embryo is both something that may have considerable moral status 
and something that may well not have considerable moral status …. 
Just as we should approach the use and destruction of the human 
embryo with “fear and trembling”, so too should we approach the 
prevention of its use in the same way. By researching on the human 
embryo we may well be destroying something that has considerable 
moral status; by preventing research on the human embryo we may 
well be failing to alleviate the suffering of children and adults whom 
[sic] most certainly do have considerable moral status, for no good 
reason.’[13]
Although Gibson does not use the phrase ‘ethics of responsibility’, 
her argument fits very neatly into the first idea that we alluded to: 
ER is an ethics of fallibility. At some point, we must make a decision 
in order to move forward, but that decision can be wrong and can 
have dire consequences. Yet, not taking the decision or preventing 
some action can have equally disastrous consequences. We have to 
accept responsibility for whatever we decide, but certainty cannot 
be demanded of us. What can be demanded, however, is the full 
catalogue of our reasons and the arguments supporting them. 
Thus, when engaging in an ER, we have no assurance of correct moral 
behaviour, but we do have assurance of responsible moral behaviour. 
The latter is mostly what can realistically be expected from moral 
agents.
Phronesis: the dialectic of norms and applications
The second aspect of the framework developed above is the 
dialectic between appeals to moral norms, on the one hand, and the 
consideration of consequences on the other. We have argued that 
to consider future consequences is inevitable and necessary in an 
appropriate moral approach. A critic of our position could ask: Why 
are you not full-fledged consequentialists? Our answer results from 
the critique of consequentialism/utilitarianism, which the first author 
has developed elsewhere.[14] As unacceptable as it is to disregard 
consequences when arguing about the morality of actions, we feel 
it is equally unacceptable to flatly ignore or disregard moral action 
guides such as norms, values and principles. To do so would be to 
ignore most of our basic moral intuitions, and the collective wisdom 
of our moral education and moral principles.
Is there a model of moral reasoning that has the potential to 
adequately accommodate both the force of moral rules and the 
responsible consideration of consequences? Or is such a possibility 
a figment of our imaginations that we wish to project onto the 
framework that we call the ER?
Our answer is that the reconciliation of the force of moral rules and 
the need to consider consequences was foreseen and developed in the 
oldest tradition of moral philosophy in the West, Aristotelianism, and 
particularly in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.[15] We refer particularly 
to Book 6 of this work, in which Aristotle deals with the ‘intellectual 
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virtues’. We devote some attention to his notion of ‘prudence’ or 
‘practical wisdom’ – these notions are the best English translations 
of the forceful Greek word phronesis (prudence or practical wisdom), 
which Aristotle explicates in this part of his Ethics. 
Phronesis, for Aristotle, is the kind of knowledge to which ethics 
aspires. It must be distinguished from two other kinds of knowledge: 
theoria, which is the theoretical knowledge, and techne, the 
knowledge that we gain in order to apply technical skills. Aristotle’s 
ethics differs quite fundamentally from that of his great teacher Plato, 
who held that all true knowledge, including ethical knowledge, is 
an instance of theoria. According to Plato, moral knowledge was 
acquired through recollecting (anamnesis) the knowledge gained 
of the Idea of the Good – the highest of the Forms in Plato’s famous 
Realm of Forms. In our pre-existence we contemplated the Idea of the 
Good; in this life, we are ‘reminded’ (anamnesis) of what we saw there. 
That means that ethical knowledge, for Plato, is essentially theoretical 
knowledge; we aspire to know what the Good is in the sense of 
ascertaining it in a comprehensive theoretical grasp, that which St. 
Augustine would call a visio et fruitio. 
For Aristotle, however, this is an impoverished idea of moral 
knowledge. For him, moral knowledge is not theoretical, but practical. 
In the sense of phronesis, it is a knowledge that enables us to act in 
many practical situations encountered in everyday life. Phronesis is 
not simply knowing what good is, what virtue is and what the rules 
that govern our behaviour are. More importantly, it is knowing how 
to act in the practical situations of everyday life where the norms 
and rules need to be applied. Such situations should influence 
policy formation rather than serve as firm rules. At the same time, 
we must understand that phronesis is not mere techne. For example, 
techne would be the skill required to fill a cavity in a tooth or to fix a 
computer. It is an ability to perform a task that is acquired, remains 
the same in every application, and can be improved. However, what 
is actually learned and applied in techne remains the same.
Phronesis, in this respect, is quite different. Phronesis is practical 
knowledge of how to live the good life. But the end of phronesis, the 
‘good life’, is not a fixed, circumscribed entity about which we are all 
in agreement, such as a painless tooth or a working computer. The 
good life is not necessarily the same for everyone. MacIntyre explains 
that ‘The good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life 
for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which 
will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life 
for man is.’[16] 
Put differently: Phronesis is a kind of knowledge of both means and 
ends. The end that we choose will influence the means we adopt to 
acquire it, and vice versa. In the words of Comte-Sponville: ‘Prudence 
has something modest or instrumental to it: it is enlisted to serve 
ends that are not its own and is concerned, for its own part, with the 
choice of means.’[17]
The content of phronesis is also not necessarily the same in every 
practical situation in which we find ourselves. For example, what 
does it mean to be courageous? In some circumstances, it might 
mean the willingness to die for the sake of others; in others, as was 
the experience of Frankl[18] in Auschwitz, it is the determination not to 
surrender and die, but to try and find meaning in the simplest things 
in order to maintain the strength to carry on.
Most importantly, phronesis (or prudence) is a kind of knowledge 
wherein I try to act in accordance with the precepts or action 
guides that I acknowledge, and which are prudently applied to 
the situation in which I find myself, and where I must act in such a 
way that I can live with the consequences. This application requires 
deliberation – a rational interchange that moves to and fro between 
the requirement of the norm and the requirements of the situation. 
Bernstein formulates it as follows: ‘[P]hronesis is a form of reasoning 
and knowledge that involves a distinctive mediation between the 
universal and the particular. This mediation is not accomplished 
by any appeal to technical rules or Method (in the Cartesian sense) 
or by the subsumption of a pre-given determinate universal to a 
particular case … phronesis is a form of reasoning which yields a 
typical ‘ethical know-how’ in which both what is universal and what 
is particular are co-determined. Furthermore, phronesis involves a 
“peculiar interlacing of being and knowledge, determination through 
one’s own becoming.” It is not to be identified with or confused with 
the type of “objective knowledge” that is detached from one’s own 
being and becoming.’[19]
Aristotle makes this clear: ‘Prudence is concerned with human 
goods, i.e. things about which deliberation is possible; for we hold 
that it is the function of the prudent man to deliberate well; and 
nobody deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise, or that 
are not means to an end, and that end a practical good. And the man 
who is good at deliberation generally is the one who can aim, by the 
help of his calculation, at the best of the goods attainable by man. 
Again, prudence is not concerned with universals only; it must also take 
cognisance of particulars, because it is concerned with conduct, and 
conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances.’[15] (Our italics).
This last sentence is the crux of our argument. Aristotle penetrates 
to the essence of what we call moral knowledge. That knowledge is 
based in the norms and action guides that pervade societal life, and 
which we inherit from our education, our religion, our conscience and 
the conventions of society. But simply to know the rules is insufficient. 
They must be responsibly applied in many practical situations. How 
they are to be applied is far from self-evident. That is something we 
learn in the practice of daily life, it takes time and we learn it in many 
ways. The way that Aristotle particularly emphasises is deliberation. 
Deliberation is an argumentative strategy that requires dialogue 
with both ourselves and others. It implies the careful weighing up 
of the claim of the norm against the requirement of the situation – 
especially bearing in mind the consequences our deeds will have. 
In this sense, deliberation (the essence of phronesis) is a dialectic 
movement between guides to action and the requirements of the 
practical situation, as well as the possible consequences of the 
action. Comte-Sponville emphasises that the exercise of prudence 
has an element of uncertainty and fallibility: ‘Prudence presupposes 
uncertainty, risk, chance and the unknown. A god would have no 
need of it, but how could a man do without it? Prudence is not a 
science; rather, it replaces science where science is lacking. One 
deliberates only when one has a choice to make, i.e. when no proof 
is possible or adequate – that’s when one must want not only good 
ends, but also good means to achieve them. To be a good father, it is 
insufficient to love one’s children nor to wish them well for that wish 
to come true. Love does not excuse a lack of intelligence. The Greeks 
knew this, perhaps, better than we. Phronesis is like practical wisdom: 
wisdom of action, for action, in action’.[17] 
Although Aristotle did not use the phrase ‘ethics of responsibility’, 
to our mind this is the essence of the ER that we have developed as 
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the overarching framework for moral argumentation in this article. It 
is the ethics that springs from the application of phronesis.
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